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Aflinnation of Statehood and
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Elected in the first multiparty elections in 1990
to the Parliament of Croatia as a representative of
the district ofDubrovnik, the author served as Presi-
dent of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign
Affairs, 1990-1992.
Croatia's tradition of statehood extends back
through the medieval period over thirteen centuries,
and continued until the establishment by the
Versailles Peace Treaty of the entity of the Slovenes-
Croatians-Serbs (in essence what came to be the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia). The Croatians' experience
with Serbia's Karadjordje dynasty during the inter-
war period and with Tito in the second Yugoslavia
only validated and strengthened traditional yearning
of all Croatian to have their own state.
The creation of the
Banovina of Croatia in
1939, and even that of the
Independent State of Croatia
in 1941 under adverse con-
ditions' were expressions of
that same desire shared by
all Croatians. The affirma-
tion of the golden thread of
Croatian statehood contin-
ued subsequently during the
Communist period, where it
was expressed in the deci-
sions taken by the ZAVNOH
(State Anti-Fascist Council
for the People's Liberation
of Croatia) and in Croatia's
constitutions, beginning
with that of 1946 and con-
tinuing to the last constitu-
tion, the 1974 Constitution
of the Socialist Republic of
Croatia. All these initiatives
reflected the basic quest for
Croatian independence, de-
spite the fact that they were
manipulated from the top
with the intent, on the one
hand, of creating the illusion
of legality and of building
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legitimacy for Communist Yugoslavia and, on the
other, of attracting support from the Croatian popu-
lation.
This said, it is important to point out that the
provisions enshrined in the Constitution of the So-
cialist Republic of Croatia guaranteed the right of
nations to self-determination - to include the right
to secede - and also guaranteed precisely determined
borders among the republics. This was to have a sig-
nificant impact on Croatia's achieving diplomatic
recognition.
In order to understand fully Croatia's situa-
tion during this crucial period of 1990-1992 - to
which the fate or collapse of the second, Commu-
nist, Yugoslavia was also closely connected - it is
necessary to take into con-
sideration the political situ-
ation abroad, and especially
that in Europe, as well as to
assess the political balance
within the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (SFRY) itself.
In the present assess-
ment, I wi IInot deal in great
detail with the domestic po-
litical situation. Rather, I
will focus on the interna-
tional political context over
the last several years, one
whose principal actors were
not favourably disposed to
the disintegration and col-
lapse of even an artificially-
created state (or the
"Yugoslav tragedy" as it has
been called with good rea-
son).
The article gives a historical
overview of the political
developments leading to the
break-up of Yugoslavia and,
subsequently, affirmation of the
Croatian state and its territorial
integrity. The initial international
situation was not in favour of
Croatian independence since the
international community intended
to preserve the common Yugoslav
state. After the Croatian (and
Siovenian) declaration of
independence (1991) the EC and
UN began to see the impossibility
of a Yugoslav state, a fact soon
highlighted by the aggressive
Belgrade's military intervention.
Further, particular role of Germany
and diplomatic recognition of
Croatian state are discussed
including an overview of the
developments concerning the
final recognition of Croatian
territorial integrity.
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within the European context, would require an analy-
sis in considerable detail of the Congresses of Vienna
and Berlin, the Versailles and Rapallo Treaties, and
the league of Nations, as well as of the Monroe,
Wilson, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan Doc-
trines. In dealing with these very important prin-
ciples, we will have to limit ourselves, however, only
to those historical sources which have a direct bear-
ing on an understanding of present-day international
relations, such as the United Nations Charter, the
Helsinki Final Act, the basic documents of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), and the 1989 Paris Charter. One is com-
pletely justified in viewing these documents as the
basis for generally-accepted terms of reference and
as the legal basis of the present-day interstate sys-
tem in Europe, also taking into account, of course,
the role of NATO and the European Union.
Here, I will address only one basic principle
which was established by the Wilson Doctrine just
before the end of World War I, and which even to-
day is, still seen as the keystone of that doctrine,
namely "the right of peoples to self-determination".
This principle, and rightly so, found a prominent
place in the principles of the League of Nations and,
later, in the United Nations Charter, as well as in
CSCE documents.
This principle played determinant role in the
new framework after World War I as well as in the
international process of deco Ionization.
However, although the principle of national
self-determination was applied when the interna-
tional community recognized Croatia and Slovenia,
today it is no longer the keystone principle, nor is it
decisive, in international relations.
Significantly, President Bush's term in office,
which coincided with the collapse of the Commu-
nist system and the disintegration of the last two neo-
colonialist states in Europe - the USSR and the
SFRY - introduced and made part' of the United
States' day-to-day conduct of foreign policy a new
doctrine which was diametrically opposed to the
Wilson Doctrine. Known as the Bush Doctrine, the
latter held that "States may neither be destroyed nor
created." That, in fact, meant that those countries
which were recognized in late eighties of the present
century present cannot be allowed to disappear or to
disintegrate, and, by the same token, that one can-
not allow new states to be born. All this is in line
with the very well known attitude of "the great pow-
ers" in favor of preserving the status quo ante, which
is also the prevailing ethos of international relations,
especially as conducted by the great powers of the
world. Confirmation of this way of thinking was
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evident in the United Nations' behavior, especially
when De Cuellar was its Secretary-General. Given
this framework, it was not by accident that Budimir
Loncar, the Foreign Minister of the SFRY - then
already in its death-throes - sought to frighten and
threaten the world at the CSCE summit in Berlin on
19 June 1991 by claiming that "The collapse ofYu-
goslavia would be like a time-bomb in the middle of
Europe and could even now spark a chain reaction
on the old continent, in which there are already forty-
six ethnic conflicts."
De Cuellar's successor as Secretary-General
of the United Nations, Butros Butros Ghali con-
firmed his support for the maintenance of the status
quo during the initial period of his term by his even
greater insistence that the United Nations would no
longer be able to respect the principle of "national
self-determination", since that would confront the
international community with massive upheaval,
given the fact that would lead to the emergence of
more new states than the total of those which exist
at present, forcing the United Nations to cope with a
situation in which there would be more than four
hundred states.
Looking at the international world order at the
end of the twentieth century, one can conclude with-
out exaggerating that the Slovenes and Croatians
caught one of the last trains of independence, al-
though clearly also relying heavily on the principle
of a nation's right to self-defense. At the same time,
Croatia must be aware that, now that right has been
taken advantage of and used up, the contemporary
principles of the world order must take precedence,
which in the case of Croatia is eminently pragmatic.
The principle of national self-determination must
now be treated as a historical category. Croatia must
adhere to the concept of the world's great powers to
the effect that this principle from the Wilson Doc-
trine, despite its continuing presence in the United
Nations Charter, has undergone a revision.
However, it was not only because of the evo-
lution in the world's understanding of the right of
self-determination that Croatia's prospects for
achieving the Croatian people's centuries-old desire
for an independent Croatia were daunting. There
were also other obstacles:
1. Yugoslavia's standing and reputation around the
world which it achieved in 1948 as the first "dissi-
dent" state by standing up to Stalin and the
Cominform and, subsequently, as a leader in the Non-
Aligned Movement.
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2. The interests of the permanent members of the
United Nations' Security Council.
a. Great Britain and France. They were the main pa-
trons of the creation of Yugoslavia - or Greater Serbia
- following both world wars, and there was close
diplomatic coordination among Belgrade, London
and Paris. Of course, there is an additional reason
for this sensitivity, for one cannot exclude the possi-
bility of similar movements in Northern Ireland,
Wales or, in Scotland and, as far as France is con-
cerned, in Corsica and in its Basque region.
b. The United States, as a result of its experience in
Vietnam has consistently followed a policy of avoid-
ing becoming engaged militarily in crises which do
not threaten directly its vital interests and in which
it cannot guarantee a successful and quick outcome.
In the case of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia,
the United States has taken advantage of its inertia
and indecisiveness, delivering the problem first to-
ward the European Community and subsequently
steering it toward the United Nations.
c. Following the collapse of the "Eastern bloc" and
the voluntary but unavoidable dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact - which accompanied the convulsions
of the USSR's economic collapse, Russia, using its
position on the Security Council to ensure that de-
velopments in and the lessons from the Balkans did
not spread to its Eurasian landmass, supported
Yugoslavia's continued existence. The first Russian
ambassador to Croatia, Mr. Kerestezhants, acknowl-
edged that formerly for Russia Belgrade was equiva-
lent to Yugoslavia, as a result of which no attention
at all was paid to the other republics and peoples in
the former Yugoslavia. This was the case not only in
Russia or in the former USSR, but also in most of
the rest of the world and even in Europe. In addi-
tion, the impact of Russia's also being Orthodox and
of its traditional alliance with Serbia should not be
underestimated.
d. China was also hesitating because of its ethnic
composition and its determination that while accept-
ing the need for changes in its social structure by a
gradual adoption of market conditions it would
freeze the democratization of its political system.
Above all China viewed the example of Croatia and
Slovenia as an unwelcome precedent for the future
of Tibet and even Taiwan.
3. The end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of the
USSR from the world's political stage as a "super-
power" the voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unsuccessful coup
attempt in Moscow in August 1991 - which all oc-
curred without the firing of a single shot - lulled
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Europe into thinking that armed conflict would no
longer be possible in Europe, and that it was only a
painful memory from the past. The Paris Charter,
filled as it is with wonderful declarations about or-
der in Europe as the Eastern Bloc was disappearing,
is basically: flawed, however, since it does not pro-
vide for penalties sanctions and for those who do
not respect the Charter's principles and prescriptions.
Clearly, Europe underestimated the possibility for
tyrants such as Saddam Husayn or Idi Amin to still
emerge in Europe. 1
4. The international community saw the breakdown
of the "Extraordinary" Congress of Yugoslavia's
League of Communists in January 1990 and the re-
sults of the first democratic elections as part of a
gradual democratization process within the continu-
ing framework of Yugoslavia and as the result of the
meltdown of Communism. Within that context, the
fact was ignored that power in Slovenia, Croatia,
Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina had passed
newly emerged to genuinely democratic political
parties, while in Serbia and Montenegro the same
totalitarian Communist parties remained in power,
only cynically "Communist" from their name.
5. In January 1991, Europe and the rest of the world
were focused on the Gulf War. Only thus can one
explain that the ultimatum from the leadership of
the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army on January
9, ordering the surrender of the Territorial Defense
Forces' arms in Croatia and Slovenia, and the "Com-
munique" by the Information Directorate of the Fed-
eral Secretariat for National Defense on January 24
were completely ignored by governments abroad and
even largely passed over by the world media. Even
though there was talk at the time of a "quiet" mili-
tary coup or of a creeping toward military rule, one
can take January 24, 1991 as the date when that oc-
curred. It was on that day that the Yugoslav Army
announced that it was the leading and the determin-
ing force in the former Yugoslavia, and that it was
above and outside any official political body in the
state, disregarding at this stage a role of Slobodan
Milosevic his right-hand man Borisav Jovic may
have played in shaping events.
6. During the first half of 1991, official positions
throughout Europe toward the Yugoslav crisis were
identical to those of France and Great Britain. For
example, at the end of the European Community
Summit on 7 April 1991 , Jacques Santer announced
the European Community's agreed-upon positions.
a. That the European Community has a duty to sup-
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port Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity.
b. That individual republics, with Slovenia and
Croatia specifically mentioned, as integral parts of
Yugoslavia, must not foster any illusions about their
prospects of joining Europe. That opportunity will
be available in the future only to Yugoslavia.
c. That the European Community sees no reason to
become involved in the SFRY's sensitive internal
matters.
7. The visit by the United States' Secretary of State,
James Baker, to Belgrade in June 1991, his terse dis-
cussions with the president of each of the republics
of the former Yugoslavia, and his statement before
he departed, reflected the international community's
stand on the Yugoslav crisis, which Belgrade inter-
preted as a "green light" to use armed force to bring
under control the "troublemakers" in Slovenia and
Croatia.
8. On June 24,1991, the European Community an-
nounced that it had approved a loan to Yugoslavia-
read Belgrade - for 730 million ECUs, which the
federal president, Ante Markovic, viewed as a tri-
umph for his personal policy. This initiative on the
part of the European Community can only be ex-
plained as the resolute intention that all the relevant
players should get the message that the European
Twelve stood behind a "united" Yugoslavia. In for-
mal terms, this was cast as support for the Ante
Markovic government but in real terms, at the same
time this also served as encouragement to Milosevic
and the military and communist leadership, who
were now assured that they could use force and move
toward final armed confrontation without any fear
of sanctions or responsibility or punishment.
9. The approaching of the Communist system's dis-
integration in the world made additional initiatives
for political involvement of Croatian diaspora, the
process of which became especially prominent in
the USA and other countries of the New World. It is
difficult to mention all the self-sacrificing and de-
voted actions, or the help Croatian diaspora gave to
the "old country". Results of the first multi-party
elections marked the newest Croatian revival in the
homeland and we can freely say that Croats around
the world have also greeted it with great enthusi-
asm.
Under the influence of such a process, Ameri-
can officials like R. Dole, C. Pell, de Conto D' Amato,
and many others, have been pleading for Croatia and
using their authority to criticize the official policy
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of the United States of America towards Yugoslavia
and Croatia. The year 1990 can be considered the
year of strong and efficient Croatian lobbying in the
USA.
However, the Serbian lobby was also efficient
during that period. Regarding direct influence on the
course of events in Croatia, in the middle of 1990,




During the year of 1989, due to the repres-
sion of Serbian authorities on the prevailing Alba-
nian population in Kosovo, there soon were world-
wide appeals to Yugoslav authorities, to stop the use
offorce. Because of disrespect of human rights, Yu-
goslavia was condemned from the USA congress and
many other parliament institutions in the world.
Helen Delich Benltey, member of the House
of Representatives of the State of Maryland, was a
well-known lobbyist for the interests of Yugoslavia.
At the beginning of August 1990, she visited
Belgrade where she met Mr. Jovic, President of
SFRY, and Mr. Milosevic. The basic idea of her ad-
vice and warnings to her Belgrade friends was to
loosen their policy towards the population ofKosovo,
and that iff or any reason Serbia was not able to com-
ply with that request, it would certainly be in the
interest of Serbia to divert the attention of the world
public from Kosovo by generating some other cen-
tres of crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
It was understandable that Serbian military
leadership, which controlled a tremendously supe-
rior military potential, thought the alternative sug-
gestion of Mrs. Delich much more acceptable. Con-
sequently, Jovic, met Raskovic, Babic, and Opacic,
leaders of Serbs in Knin, without the presence of
any representative of Croatian government, (which
was a deviation from the usual way of communica-
tion), especially when it was made public that the
meeting took place. On the next day, August 16, INA
troops were put on the highest level of alert, and on
August 17, 1990, Serbs from the town of Knin put
barricades (beams) on roads in the areas of Knin,
Gracac, and Obrovac, This was the beginning of the
so-called "beam" revolution of which the role of the
leader of the Serbian lobby in the USA, held by Mrs.
Delich Bentley, should not be neglected.
The aim of this entire staging was to provoke
intervention of Croatian police against local Serbs,
who would then be protected by JNA for being
"threatened". National groups, in this case Serbs,
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being threatened by "Ustasha-like" authorities in
Zagreb, was a frequently used delusion. In this way
the instrumental of certain categories of the popula-
tion in those areas was achieved, even though the
possibility of some national groups being threatened
could not be denied, this being the case in areas
where a particular national group was a minority,
rather than in areas where Serbs held absolute ma-
jority, such as in Knin. Authorities in Knin, on all
levels, are under complete control of Serbs.
The fact that the "Knin barricades" - one of
whose protagonists was partly Mrs. Delich Bentley,
who was obsessed with assessments that Croatia eco-
nomically could not exist as an independent state -
did not offer a pretext for direct military confronta-
tion and did not force a change in the democrati-
cally elected government in Croatia, left a military
option as the main and the only solution for
Milosevic.
Of course, in relying on enormous military
superiority, Belgrade chose the military solution fol-
lowing indisputable assessments, coming from both
Yugoslav Counter Intelligence and Yugoslav diplo-
macy, that Europe and the world would idly tolerate
the use of heavy weapons for the purpose ofpacifi-
cation of those republics which chose parliament
democracy as the basic value of political activity.
The only topic left open was when and under which
excuse the Serbian Army would attack on democrati-
cally elected governments in Croatia and Slovenia.
Belgrade's choice - war option
Slovenia was the first one to be attacked, but
after the 6-day war the Serbian Army facing defeat,
restricted the creation of Serbo-slavia' to Yugosla-
via, without Slovenia. On July 6, 1991 General
Blagoje Adzic paraphrased the adventure in Slovenia
in his aggressive speech: "We lost a battle, but not
the war". Thorough personnel and other preparations
to regain the spoiled reputation of the Yugoslav Army
were hastily made.
Milosevic - Saddam of the Balkans - for
whom the British Guardian already in the Summer
of 1991 said that he was "leading Serbian into a para-
noia of wilderness" and who was described by The
New York Times as a "Butcher of the Balkans" and
most certainly of the last communist regime in Eu-
rope - adjusted his policy after the, 6-day war to
their realistic abilities as seen from the Belgrade per-
spective. His slogans, "All Serbs in one state", serv-
ing the protection of Serbian hood, are actually Nazi.
Let us recall Hitler, with his "blunt und boden" theory
started with Anshluss (Austria), continued with
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Sudetes (the Czech Republic) and Danzig (Poland),
after which Great Britain and France, although un-
prepared, announced war on Hitler's Germany. This
is the beginning of World War II.
Disregarding the achievements and traditions
of European civilization concerning human rights
and rights of minorities and national groups, in agree-
ment with the principles and particular solutions of
the Treaty of Paris, Milosevic's strategy contains the
nationalistic slogan, which was the only means of
achieving a more perfidious goal: imposing Belgrade
centralistic-unitarian government upon all republics
of the former Yugoslavia, except upon Slovenia.
Milosevic could have never received support in
Serbia if he had intended to restrict himself to the
territory of Serbia, Montenegro, and those areas in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, where Serbs
were in majority. Hypocritical Milosevic was sure
that under the mask of Markovic's federal govern-
ment, politically exploiting his role as "protector of
the undivided Yugoslavia" and deluding Serbia and
the world, that he represented the same positions as
the rest of the world headed by the USA and espe-
cially the relevant international institutions he would
achieve his goals.
Milosevic used demagogy, deceptions, and
also force to convince that with the help of IN A and
others he would be able to impose his regime upon
regions from Gevgelija to Varazdin, Umag and Pula.
These were the appetites of those who represented
the idea of Great Serbia and unitarian Yugoslavia,
as well as of the radicals when they began the con-
quest, allegedly only to the line of Karlobag-
Karlovac- Virovitica.
The United States of America gave Milosevic
6 months, from June until December of 1991, to carry
out his demonic ambitions. For the sake of histori-
cal truth it is also necessary to put before the public
that during the period when Milosevic had a green
light to carry out his Greater Serbian intentions, there
were attitudes in relevant places which differed from
official policy, then conducted by the EC and the
USA. The author of these lines was a witness to those
events. In the political department of NATO in Brus-
sels, already in mid-June 1991, a working model
titled Europe's Lebanon was made in which it was
suggested in a drafted working paper that NATO and
the EC jointly should, among other lines, contain
the following elements:
quote
a) "identification of the aggressor in the
Yugoslav conflict and the condemnation of chang-
ing borders between republics by force;
b) appeal to all democratic forces to oppose
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the use of force and to search for a solution to the
conflict by means of negotiations on the basis of prin-
ciples and stipulations of the Helsinki Final Act and
Treaty of Paris;
c) recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and
any other republic pronouncing independence, pro-
vided that it guarantees rights of minorities within
the borders established after World War II, as
well as the fulfilment of obligations form the
Helsinski Final Act and Treaty of Paris;
d) beginning a diplomatic campaign for in-
ternationalization of the conflict within the UN;
e) possibility of economic embargo on Serbia
with a remark put in brackets that it would be
counter-productive to impose an arms embargo upon
all Yugoslav republics, since Serbian militia and
JNA, compared to other forces, were military better
equipped."
This initiative within NATO, which was not
only one of the most important, but also the only
indisputable strong international military institution,
was unfortunately blocked by some members of
NATO, led by Greece. The explanation was that the
political department of NATO was not allowed to
take political stands before official political bodies
of its members had discussed certain questions, and
before certain viewpoints had been accepted at the
highest levels of NATO.
In this way a precious and critical period of
six to nine months was lost. At that moment, French
diplomacy was flirting with WEU, and the USA was
passively observing and waiting for things to de-
velop, unfortunately encouraging the aggressor by
its inertness.
Having seen that they could not extend the
"anti-bureaucratic revolution" to Ljubljana and
Zagreb by means of "peace and solidarity rallies"
using the masses which had gathered at Gazimestan
(Kosovo, in June 1989), the ruling circles in Belgrade
- and especially Milosevic and the military's top
leadership - were convinced that they could make
the disobedient Slovenes and Croatians submit
through the use of force.
That juncture approached especially after the
results of the first democratic Elections in all the
republics of the former Yugoslavia (apart form Serbia
and Montenegro). It was only a question of when,
and using what pretext for the benefit of world, not
local, opinion.
In that complex context and, given the bal-
ance of military power, the exploitation of the
"precani" Serbs (i.e. those living outside Serbia)





The Declaration ofIndependence proclaimed
unanimously by the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) on
June 25, 1991 (on the same day the Slovene Parlia-
ment proclaimed Slovenia's independence) is of con-
siderable historical significance and represents the
inevitable and resolute, as well as the justified, ex-
pression of the will and centuries-old aspirations of
the Croatian people.
By so doing, Croatia became a legally-inde-
pendent actor sui generis, notwithstanding the hos-
tile stance of what remained of the federal govern-
ing structure - and especially of the military estab-
lishment - dominated by Milosevic's hypocritical
policy of maintaining a unified Yugoslavia, and the
activation of the federal government headed by Ante
Markovic and Budimir Loncar on the international
scene with the intent of preserving Yugoslavia.
The arrival of J. Poos, Hans van den Broek,
and Gianni De Michelis just three days after Croatia's
declaration of independence, the Brijuni Declara-
tion, numerous visits by parliamentary delegations
and official representatives of other states and inter-
national organizations, the European Community's
declaration of August 27, 1991, and the October
1991 UN Security Council Resolution 713 on Yu-
goslavia were all indications that Croatia had be-
come an independent actor and that it had established
its sovereignty.
The first decision taken by the European
Community's Arbitration Commission on Decem-
ber, 7 1991 (which was chaired by Robert Badinter,
who was the president of France's Constitution re-
sponse to a request for clarification from Lord
Carrington, the President of the Conference on Yu-
goslavia, and clearly noted the position in section 1
(a) that, in accordance with the intent ofintemational
law, "the existence or disappearance of a state is a
question offact, and the effect of recognition by other
state is of a declarative nature only".
It is worth quoting here the often-forgotten
summary decision by the European Community's
Arbitration Commission, which is expressed in three
points:
* The SFRY is in the process of disintegrat-
mg.
* It is up to the republics to settle the ques-
tions of state succession, subject to the principles
and rules of international law, especially with re-
gard to respecting human rights and the rights of
national groups and minorities.
* Those republics which may wish to do so
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may form a new association which would contain
democratic institutions of their choice.
To Croatia, the European Community's dip-
lomatic initiatives and other political steps taken
around the world appeared to be slow, bureaucratic,
and ineffective. This is perhaps not a surprising re-
action for a country which lacked everything except
self-sacrifice and courage in its struggle to defend
its native soil from aggression by a militarily much
more powerful foe. Days seemed like weeks, and
months like years, to those who experienced the
martyrdom of the inhabitants of Vukovar, Osijek,
Petrinja, Karlovac, Sunja, Slunj, Kojevo, Skabmja,
Dubrovnik, and Cavtat. This notwithstanding, we
must assess objectively the facts, circumstances, and
what was possible within the context of the interna-
tional situation, and acknowledge that Croatia's rec-
ognition by the European Twelve on January 15,
1992, as well as by many other states, came more
quickly than we could have expected or hoped for
in the Summer and Autumn of 1991.
It is important to also assess what factors in-
fluenced this chain of events.
The draft of the Hague "Convention on Yu-
goslavia" contained the accepted and unchallenged
option that each republic of the former Yugoslavia,
if it wished to, could become independent and that
act in and of itself was sufficient for recognition by
the European Community and, consequently, by the
international community. The third section of this
draft also contained a complete plan for the estab-
lishment of joint economic and transportation rela-
tions which took as their model relations at a some-
what lower level of integration than was the cases
among the countries of the European Community
prior to Maastricht. A closer examination of the draft
was enough to convince anyone that accepting those
proposals would not lead to a "Third Yugoslavia".
The British (Lord Carrington), Dutch (van den
Broek), and French (Badinter) trio planned, in a prag-
matic way, to impose that structure on all the repub-
lics of the former Yugoslavia as part of a package of
comprehensive solutions, accompanied by automatic
diplomatic recognition of the complete sovereignty
and independence of all those republics who re-
quested that. However, this was meant to be only
upon the conclusion of the conference. The Confer-
ence on Yugoslavia, as it was envisioned by the Eu-
ropean Community, under the chairmanship of Lord
Carrington, de facto was the requiem for Yugosla-
via.
Belgrade's approach (that is Milosevic's ap-
proach), however, was based on an assessment that
the European Community would respect the "Bush
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Doctrine", especially in light of the frequent high-
lighting by international players of the need to pre-
serve a united Yugoslavia. Belgrade believed that,
in the meantime, Croatia's resistance would be bro-
ken using military force and that with a "fait
accompli" it could create a Greater Serbia. By add-
ing a few cosmetic initiatives on transitioning to a
market economy; on the respect of human rights,
etc., Milosevic believed he could create a "modem
federation" according to his vision; which would sat-
isfy Europe while also serving the interests of a
Greater Serbia. At the same time, such a Yugoslavia
was to be capable of withstanding the alleged
"Vatican-Comintern" conspiracy against Yugoslavia
and, specifically; against Serbia.
Van den Broek and the other European lead-
ers were convinced that political means backed up
by threats of economic sanctions and various prom-
ises, especially in the economic arena, would be suf-
ficient to bring about a cease fire. This approach,
however, was the main cause for the failure and in-
effectiveness of the European Community in deal-
ing with Yugoslavia. At the same time, Serbia's de-
termination to "pacify" all its opponents by using
every available means, including brute force, was to
lead to a race against time.
The Croatian Sabor, having respected the
three-month moratorium on implementing the Dec-
laration of Independence, passed on 8th October 1991
a resolution cutting all its constitutional links to the
other republics and autonomous provinces with
whom Croatia had established the SFRY.
As soon as Milosevic realized that he would
not be able to achieve his objectives by using the
European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia
and that he would not be able to frustrate the Euro-
pean Community's plans for the former Yugoslavia,
Serbia began to obstruct any progress by the Con-
ference on Yugoslavia, although Montenegrin presi-
dent Momir Bulatovic on October 18, 1991, an-
nounced at the Conference that Montenegro would
accept the draft resolution as envisioned by the Con-
ference. Yugoslav diplomacy, in effect Serbia, how-
ever, now became active in steering any further ne-
gotiations on the Yugoslav crisis toward the United
Nations, counting on Russia's favoritism, and the
support of some non-aligned nations. The intention
all of this was to buy time and to prevent the diplo-
matic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, with the
aim of rescuing the notion of a third Yugoslavia
which was envisioned along hegemonic lines.
During this critical period, many foreign
policymakers were erroneous due to serious mistakes
in their public statements, most often because of their
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lack of understanding of what was happening in this
region and, in particular, because they did not grasp
what kind of conflict this was. Thus, there were as-
sessments claiming that in Yugoslavia was a "civil
war" or a "religious war" and there were declara-
tions along the lines that "any solution which is
reached by peaceful means will be accepted." How-
ever, Belgrade always interpreted such calls for peace
as "let us continue the violence, since there is no
solution until the militarily weaker opponent is de-
feated, which will result in a peace which the world
will accept", as had been a true after the Tia-nan-
men Square massacre in China.
Declarations by the United States that it had
vital interests in Macedonia by default implied that
it did not have such interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and thereby gave Serbia a clear signal that it would
have a free hand in the latter.
Time was a key factor in implementing the
plans envisioned by the main players of the Euro-
pean Conference. Due to Serbia's obstruction, the
Conference was unable to achieve the results which
the member-states expected, while at the same time
violence directed by Serbia and the Yugoslav Army
escalated into full-scale aggression against Croatia.
The first appeals and calls for an end to the violence
and for measures to halt Serbia were starting to come
from official sources in Austria, Germany, and the
Vatican, in no small part thanks to the great efforts
by the Croatian diaspora.
Although it is not possible to scrutinize ex-
actly at this stage how events developed day-by-day
within the European Community, we do know that
the positions of the twelve member-states toward
Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of indepen-
dence were not all the same. A polarization within
the European Twelve was evident very early. On one
side stood France, Great Britain, Greece, and Spain,
that met Croatia's and Slovenia's desire for freedom
and independence with unconcealed disfavor. At
first, Italy and the Netherlands also held positions
close to these. On the other side, Germany, Belgium,
and Denmark and, to a certain extent, Luxembourg,
showed considerably more sympathy for Croatia's
and Slovenia's sovereignty and independence, while
Ireland and Portugal took no stand.
Although European and international public
opinion firmly supported the need to maintain the
unity of Yugoslavia up to June 1991, the first dissi-
dent voice within the official European structure was
heard in the first week of June 1991, when, just be-
fore a meeting in Dresden, Germany's Martin
Bangemann, as Vice-President of the European Par-
liament, reminded the European Ministers of For-
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eign Affairs that Germany's unification too would
not have happened if the "European dogma" about
the inviolability of borders had been followed to the
letter. The right of people to self-determination must
also be taken into account and, Bengemann added
on that occasion, "As far as the legitimate principle
of non-interference in the internal affairs of indi-
vidual states is concerned, we cannot conclude that
a unified Yugoslav state must be preserved at all
costs ... Likewise, as we evolve our position, the Eu-
ropean Community cannot exert its influence from
outside only in favor of a unified Yugoslavia".
Germany Comes (Steps) Forward
Even after the very recent unification of the
two Germanies, unified Germany as referred by
many western politicians remains "an economic gi-
ant and a political dwarf'. However, Germany's eco-
nomic power was a significant factor in international
politics, particularly in Europe. Germany, in fact, was
the fulcrum of the European Community and, along
with France, the hub of European integration and of
the political direction of the New Europe.
With the escalation of aggression against
Croatia and with the seizure of Croatian territory and,
particularly, as a reaction to the terror and the at-
tempt to destroy everything in the occupied territo-
ries that was Croatian, Germany, together with Aus-
tria, was the first to use its diplomacy in a resolute
manner to respond to the appeals from the Croatian
and Slovene leaders, and was the first to take the
initiative to have Croatia and Slovenia recognized
as soon as possible.
The German public as well as all relevant po-
liticalleaders were able to identify the causes of the
escalation of violence in former Yugoslavia even
earlier, thanks to the following factors:
1. The German community which had lived
in former Yugoslavia - especially on the plains -
had been subjected in the 1920s to an intensive colo-
nization (predominantly by Serbs) in the towns and
villages which they had inhabited and on the fertile
lands they had owned for centuries.
2. At the end of World War II, there were about
500,000 ethnic Germans living in Srijem, Banat,
Backa, and Eastern Slavonija. About half of them
were forced out, the other half killed. This extermi-
nation was part of a Communist terror campaign,
the same phenomenon which today is called euphe-
mistically "ethnic cleansing". Most of the expelled
ethnic Germans moved to Austria and Germany.
These events were not written down nor taught in
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the schools and, correctly, this contributed to the rec-
onciliation process on which the New Europe is
based. Nevertheless, many Germans remained con-
scious of what had happened, thanks in particular,
to an oral tradition kept alive by relatives, descen-
dants, and friends of those expelled.
3. The German public always looked very
negatively at Yugoslavia's Communist system, given
the Germans' own direct experience with the tyr-
anny and dictatorship of the East German regime.
Even Tito's dissidence toward Moscow in 1948 did
not win for Yugoslavia any exoneration in Germany
for the undemocratic nature of the Yugoslav system.
In the 1970s, there was also the scandal surround-
ing the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, some of
whose members evaded arrest by seeking asylum in
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav police demanded the sur-
render of five Croatian emigres who were living and
working in Germany as a condition for the extradi-
tion back to Germany of these five proven German
terrorists. Naturally, such an exchange was not ac-
ceptable to Germany, and the Yugoslav authorities
facilitated the Baader-Meinhofterrorists' subsequent
escape to the Middle East. The considerable public-
ity which Yugoslavia received in the German media
at the time contributed - and justifiably so - even
further to Yugoslavia's negative image.
4. Many of the German media's reporters -
such as Karl Gustav Strohm, Viktor Meier, Hans-
Petar Rullmann, and Johann Reismuller - knew the
Slavic languages in use in Yugoslavia. They were
thus able to travel the breadth of the former Yugo-
slavia and to report with greater credibility and with
a better grasp of events than their counterparts from
Paris, London, and Washington, who sat in Belgrade
and who sent back home an image exclusively as
seen from their window in Belgrade.
5. It is well-known that the Yugoslav UDBA
(secret police), with the help of Yugoslav diplomats
and consular representatives abroad, systematically
organized dozens of attacks against Croatian
emigres. Most of these attacks occurred in Germany
and, in some of these cases, the German legal sys-
tem correctly and with solid proof was able to dis-
cover the motives for the attacks and to implicate
official Yugoslav agencies in the assassinations.
Moreover, these results were made public in Ger-
many. On the contrary, in the case of the killing of
Bruno Busic in Paris and of Maksim Krstulovic in
London, the local police knew that they had been
carried out by Yugoslav agents, but did not pursue
an investigation. In the case of the attempted assas-
sination ofNikola Stedul (in Scotland) by Sindicic,
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the Yugoslav secret operative in Great Britain, for
example, the latter was apprehended before the mo-
tive for the attack had become clear. Sindicic was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison, but only for a
purely criminal act. Thus, the British public, as that
in France in the Bruno Busic case, was deprived of
the full truth or of information about the criminal




It is commonplace that interest and power are
the basic factors of politics. Although this is unde-
niable, in this case it is not correct to assume that
Germany abandoned the well-established guidelines
adopted by the European Community because of its
own interests, such as the expansion of its spheres
of influence. Alongside the initiative in German di-
plomacy led by Foreign Minister Hans Dieter
Genscher (obviously working together with Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl), it is important also to stress
the following: Without detracting from the ability
and devotion of Germany's Foreign Minister and of
many other German officials in their efforts to gain
diplomatic recognition for Croatia, Germany's di-
plomacy could not have acted differently, since it
was responding to pressure from its entire public
opunon.
I believe that it is abundantly evident that pub-
lic opinion in Germany as well as in Austria, Hun-
gary, and Australia, for different reasons) on the is-
sue of diplomatic recognition for Croatia and
Slovenia was radically different from public opin-
ion in Great Britain, France, and the United States,
and especially from that in the Soviet Union and in
the vast majority of other countries.
The United States had relinquished the initia-
tive on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia completely
to the European Community and, in November 1991,
senior officials in the Bush Administration informed
their German counterparts that the United States was
prepared to support any initiative which Germany
might undertake, assessing that this would contrib-
ute to the development of freedom, peace, and de-
mocracy. •
Second part of the article
will follow in the next issue.
